[ Moore and Repullo, Econometrica 58 (1990) [1083][1084][1085][1086][1087][1088][1089][1090][1091][1092][1093][1094][1095][1096][1097][1098][1099] and [Dutta and Sen, Rev. Econom. Stud. 58 (1991) 121-128] are two fundamental papers on two-agent Nash implementation. Both of them are based on Maskin's classic paper [Maskin, Rev. Econom. Stud. 66 (1999) Inter. J. Quantum Information, 2010 (accepted)] shows that when an additional condition is satisfied, the Maskin's theorem will no longer hold by using a quantum mechanism. Furthermore, this result holds in the macro world by using an algorithmic mechanism. In this paper, we will investigate two-agent Nash implementation by virtue of the algorithmic mechanism. The main result is: The sufficient and necessary conditions for Nash implementation with two agents shall be amended, not only in the quantum world, but also in the macro world.
Introduction
Game theory and mechanism design play important roles in economics. Game theory aims to investigate rational decision making in conflict situations, whereas mechanism design just concerns the reverse question: given some desirable outcomes, can we design a game that produces them? Ref. [1] is seminal work in the field of mechanism design. It provides an almost complete characterization of social choice rules that are Nash implementable when the number of agents is at least three. In 1990, Moore and Repullo [2] gave a necessary and sufficient condition for Nash implementation with two agents and many agents. Dutta and Sen [3] independently gave an equivalent result for two-agent Nash implementation. In 2009, Busetto and Codognato [4] gave an amended necessary and sufficient condition for two-agent Nash implementation. These papers together construct a framework for two-agent Nash implementation.
In 2010, Wu [5] claimed that the Maskin's theorem are amended by virtue of a quantum mechanism, i.e., a social choice rule that is monotonic and satisfies no-veto will not be Nash implementable if it satisfies an additional condition. Although current experimental technologies restrict the quantum mechanism to be commercially available, Wu [6] propose an algorithmic mechanism that amends the sufficient and necessary conditions for Nash implementation with three or more agents in the macro world. Inspired by these results, it is natural to ask what will happen if the algorithmic mechanism can be generalized to two-agent Nash implementation. This paper just concerns this question.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 recalls preliminaries of two-agent Nash implementation given by Moore and Repullo [2] . Section 3 and 4 are the main parts of this paper, in which we will propose two-agent quantum and algorithmic mechanisms respectively. Section 5 draws the conclusions. In Appendix, we explain that the social choice rule given in Section 3 satisfies condition µ2 defined by Moore and Repullo.
Preliminaries
Consider an environment with a finite set I = {1, 2} of agents, and a (possibly infinite) set A of feasible outcomes. The profile of the agents' preferences over outcomes is indexed by θ ∈ Θ, where Θ is the set of preference profiles. Under θ, agent j ∈ I has preference ordering R j (θ) on the set A. Let P j (θ) denote the strict preference relation corresponding to R j (θ).
For any j ∈ I, θ ∈ Θ and a ∈ A, let L j (a, θ) be the lower contour set of agent j at a under θ, i.e., L j (a, θ) = {â ∈ A : aR j (θ)â}. For any j ∈ I, θ ∈ Θ and C ⊆ A, let M j (C, θ) be the set of maximal elements in C for agent j under θ, i.e., M j (C, θ) = {ĉ ∈ C :ĉR j (θ)c, for all c ∈ C}.
A social choice rule (SCR) is a correspondence f : Θ → A that specifies a nonempty set f (θ) ⊆ A for each preference profile θ ∈ Θ. A mechanism is a function g : S → A that specifies an outcome g(s) ∈ A for each vector of strategies s = (s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ S = S 1 × S 2 , where S j denotes agent j's strategy set.
A mechanism g together with a preference profile θ ∈ Θ defines a game in normal form. Let NE(g, θ) ⊆ S denote the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game (g, θ). A mechanism g is said to Nash implement an SCR f if for all θ ∈ Θ, {g(s) : s ∈ NE(g, θ)} = f (θ).
Condition µ: There is a set B ⊆ A, and for each j ∈ I, θ ∈ Θ, and a ∈ f (θ), there is a set C j (a, θ) ⊆ B, with a ∈ M j (C j (a, θ), θ) such that for all θ * ∈ Θ, (i), (ii) and (iii) are satisfied:
Condition µ2: Condition µ holds. In addition, for each 4-tuple (a, θ, b, φ) ∈ A × Θ × A × Θ, with a ∈ f (θ) and b ∈ f (φ), there exists e = e(a, θ, b, φ)
Theorem 1 (Moore and Repullo, 1990) : Suppose that there are two agents. Then a social choice rule f is Nash implementable if and only if it satisfies condition µ2.
To facilitate the following discussion, here we cite the Moore-Repullo's mechanism as follows: For each agent j ∈ I, Let S j = {(θ j , a j , b j , n j ) ∈ Θ×A×B×N : a j ∈ f (θ j )}, where N denotes the set of non-negative integers, and define the mechanism g : S → A such that for any s ∈ S:
A two-agent quantum mechanism
In this section, first we will show an example of a Pareto-inefficient two-agent SCR f that satisfies condition µ2, i.e., it is Nash implementable according to Moore-Repullo's mechanism. Then, we will propose a two-agent version of quantum mechanism, which amends the sufficient and necessary conditions for Nash implementation for two agents. Hence, f will not be Nash implementable in the quantum domain.
A Pareto-inefficient two-agent SCR
Consider an SCR f given in Table 1 .
In each preference profile, the preference relations over the outcome set A and the corresponding SCR f are given in Table 1 . f is Pareto-inefficient from the viewpoint of two agents because in the preference profile θ = θ 2 , both agents prefer a Pareto-efficient outcome a 1 ∈ f (θ 1 ): for each agent j ∈ I, a 1 P j (θ 2 )a 2 . However, since f satisfies condition µ2 (see the Appendix), it is Nash implementable according to Moore-Repullo's theorem. Table 1 . A Pareto-inefficient two-agent SCR f that satisfies condition µ2.
A two-agent quantum mechanism
Following Ref. [5] , here we will propose a two-agent quantum mechanism to help agents combat "bad" social choice functions. According to Eq (4) in Ref. [8] , two-parameter quantum strategies are drawn from the set:
Without loss of generality, we assume: 1) Each agent j ∈ I has a quantum coin j (qubit) and a classical card j . The basis vectors |C ≡ (1, 0)
T , |D ≡ (0, 1) T of a quantum coin denote head up and tail up respectively. 2) Each agent j ∈ I independently performs a local unitary operation on his/her own quantum coin. The set of agent j's operation isΩ j =Ω. A 
3) The two sides of a card are denoted as Side 0 and Side 1. The information written on the Side 0 (or Side 1) of card j is denoted as card(j, 0) (or card(j, 1)). A typical card of agent j is described as c j = (card(j, 0), card(j, 1)) ∈ S j × S j , where S j is defined in Moore-Repullo's mechanism. The set of c j is denoted as C j ≡ S j × S j . 4) There is a device that can measure the state of two quantum coins and send strategies to the designer.
Note that ifΩ j is restricted to be {Î,D}, thenΩ j is equivalent to {Not flip, Flip}.
Definition 1: A two-agent quantum mechanism is defined asĜ :Ŝ → A, whereŜ =Ŝ 1 ×Ŝ 2 ,Ŝ j =Ω j × C j (j ∈ I).Ĝ can also be written asĜ :
We shall useŜ −j to expressΩ k × C k (k = j), and thus, a strategy profile iŝ
A Nash equilibrium ofĜ played in a preference profile θ is a strategy profileŝ
For each θ ∈ Θ, the pair (Ĝ, θ) defines a game in normal form. Let NE(Ĝ, θ) ⊆Ŝ denote the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game (Ĝ, θ). Fig. 1 illustrates the setup of the two-agent quantum mechanismĜ. Its working steps are shown as follows:
Step 1: The state of each quantum coin is set as |C . The initial state of the two quantum coins is |ψ 0 = |CC .
Step 2: Given a preference profile θ, if the two following conditions are satisfied, goto Step 4:
, a ∈ f (θ)) for each agent j ∈ I, and a ′ P k (θ)a for at least one agent k ∈ I;
2) If there exists θ ′′ ∈ Θ, θ ′′ = θ ′ that satisfies the former condition, then
) for each agent j ∈ I, and a ′ P k (θ)a ′′ for at least one agent k ∈ I.
Step 3: Each agent j sets c j = ((θ j , a j , b j , n j ), (θ j , a j , b j , n j )) ∈ S j × S j and ω j =Î. Goto Step 7.
Step 4: Each agent j sets c j = ((θ ′ , a ′ , * , 0), (θ j , a j , b j , n j )). Let the two quantum coins be entangled byĴ. |ψ 1 =Ĵ|CC .
Step 5: Each agent j independently performs a local unitary operationω j on his/her own quantum coin. |ψ 2 = [ω 1 ⊗ω 2 ]Ĵ |CC .
Step 6: Let the two quantum coins be disentangled byĴ
Step 7: The device measures the state of the two quantum coins and sends card(j, 0) (or card(j, 1)) as the strategy s j to the designer if the state of quantum coin j is |C (or |D ).
Step 8: The designer receives the overall strategy s = (s 1 , s 2 ) and let the final outcome be g(s) using rules (1)-(6) of the Moore-Repullo's mechanism. END.
Given two agents, consider the payoff to the second agent, we denote by $ CC the expected payoff when the two agents both chooseÎ (the corresponding collapsed state is |CC ), and denote by $ CD the expected payoff when the first agent chooseÎ and the second agent choosesD (the corresponding collapsed state is |CD ). $ DD and $ DC are defined similarly. For the case of two-agent Nash implementation, the condition λ in Ref. [5] is reformulated as the following condition λ ′ : 1) λ ′ 1 : Given an SCR f , a preference profile θ ∈ Θ and a ∈ f (θ), there exists
, a ∈ f (θ)) for each agent j ∈ I, and a ′ P k (θ)a for at least one agent k ∈ I. In going from θ ′ to θ both agents encounter a preference change around a
) for each agent j ∈ I, and a ′ P k (θ)a ′′ for at least one agent k ∈ I. 3) λ ′ 3 : For each agent j ∈ I, let him/her be the second agent and consider his/her payoff, $ CC > $ DD . 4) λ ′ 4 : For each agent j ∈ I, let him/her be the second agent and consider his/her payoff, $ CC > $ CD cos 2 γ + $ DC sin 2 γ.
Proposition 1: For two agents, given a preference profile θ ∈ Θ and a "bad" SCR f (from the viewpoint of agents) that satisfies condition µ2, agents who satisfies condition λ ′ can combat the "bad" SCR f by virtue of a two-agent quantum mechanismĜ :Ŝ → A, i.e., there exists a Nash equilibriumŝ * ∈ NE(Ĝ, θ) such thatĜ(ŝ * ) / ∈ f (θ).
The proof is straightforward according to Proposition 2 in Ref. [5] . Let us reconsider the SCR f given in Section 3. Therefore, in the preference profile θ = θ 2 , there exists a novel Nash equilibriumŝ
Step 8 the strategy received by the designer is s = (s 1 , s 2 ) , where
.e., the Moore and Repullo's theorem does not hold for the "bad" social choice rule f by virtue of the two-agent quantum mechanismĜ.
A two-agent algorithmic mechanism
Following Ref. [6] , in this section we will propose a two-agent algorithmic mechanism to help agents benefit from the two-agent quantum mechanism immediately.
Matrix representations of quantum states
In quantum mechanics, a quantum state can be described as a vector. For a two-level system, there are two basis vectors: (1, 0) T and (0, 1) T . In the beginning, we define: Fig. 2 . The inputs and outputs of the two-agent algorithm.
A two-agent algorithm
Following Ref. [6] , here we will propose a two-agent version of algorithm that simulates the quantum operations and measurements in Step 4-7 ofĜ given in Section 3.2. The entanglement measurement γ can be simply set as its maximum π/2. The inputs and outputs of the two-agent algorithm are shown in Fig. 2 . The Matlab program is shown in Fig. 3(a)-(d) .
2) card(j, 0), card(j, 1) ∈ S j , j = 1, 2: the information written on the two sides of agent j's card.
Outputs: s j ∈ S j , j = 1, 2: the strategy of agent j that is sent to the designer.
Procedures of the algorithm:
Step 1: Reading two parameters ξ j and φ j from each agent j (See Fig. 3(a) ).
Step 2: Computing the leftmost and rightmost columns ofω 1 ⊗ω 2 (See Fig.  3(b) ).
Step 3: Computing the vector representation of |ψ 2 = [ω 1 ⊗ω 2 ]Ĵ π/2 |CC .
Step 4: Computing the vector representation of |ψ 3 =Ĵ + π/2 |ψ 2 .
Step 5: Computing the probability distribution ψ 3 |ψ 3 (See Fig. 3(c) ).
Step 6: Randomly choosing a "collapsed" state from the set of all four possible states {|CC , |CD , |DC , |DD } according to the probability distribution ψ 3 |ψ 3 .
Step 7: For each j ∈ I, the algorithm sends card(j, 0) (or card(j, 1)) as s j to the designer if the j-th basis vector of the "collapsed" state is |C (or |D ) (See Fig. 3(d) ).
A two-agent version of algorithmic mechanism
Given a two-agent algorithm that simulates the quantum operations and measurements, the two-agent quantum mechanismĜ :
We use S j to express [0, π]×[0, π/2]×C j , and S −j to express [0, π]×[0, π/2]×C k (k = j). And thus, a strategy profile is s = ( s j , s −j ), where s j = (ξ j , φ j , c j ) ∈ S j and s −j = (ξ −j , φ −j , c −j ) ∈ S −j . A Nash equilibrium of a two-agent algorithmic mechanism G played in a preference profile θ is a strategy profile s * = ( s * 1 , s * 2 ) such that for any agent j ∈ I, s j ∈ S j , G( s *
Working steps of the two-agent algorithmic mechanism G:
Step 1: Given an SCR f and a preference profile θ, if the two following conditions are satisfied, goto Step 3:
, a ∈ f (θ)) for each agent j ∈ I, and a ′ P k (θ)a for at least one agent k ∈ I; 2) If there exists θ ′′ ∈ Θ, θ ′′ = θ ′ that satisfies the former condition, then
Step 2: Each agent j sets card(j, 0) = (θ j , a j , b j , n j ) and sends card(j, 0) as the strategy s j to the designer. Goto
Step 5.
Step 3: Each agent j sets card(j, 0) = (θ ′ , a ′ , * , 0) and card(j, 1) = (θ j , a j , b j , n j ), then submits ξ j , φ j , card(j, 0) and card(j, 1) to the two-agent algorithm.
Step 4: The two-agent algorithm runs in a computer and outputs strategies s 1 and s 2 to the designer.
Step 5: The designer receives the overall strategy s = (s 1 , s 2 ) and let the final outcome be g(s) using rules (1)-(6) of the Moore-Repullo's mechanism. END.
New result for two-agent Nash implementation
As we have seen, in the two-agent algorithmic mechanism G, the entanglement measurement γ is reduced to its maximum π/2. Hence, condition λ ′ shall be revised as λ ′π/2 , where λ : For each agent j ∈ I, let him/her be the second agent and consider his/her payoff, $ CC > $ DC .
Proposition 2: For two agents, given a preference profile θ ∈ Θ and an SCR f that satisfies condition µ2: 1) If condition λ ′π/2 is satisfied, then f is not Nash implementable. 2) If condition λ ′π/2 is not satisfied, then f is Nash implementable. Put differently, the sufficient and necessary conditions for Nash implementation with two agents are updated as condition µ2 and no-λ ′π/2 .
The proof is straightforward according to Proposition 1 in Ref. [6] . Obviously, the two-agent algorithmic mechanism proposed here is a completely "classical " one that can be run in a computer.
Conclusions
This paper generalizes the quantum and algorithmic mechanisms in Refs. [5, 6] to the case of two-agent Nash implementation. Although Moore and Repullo used the phrase "a full characterization" to claim that the problem of twoagent Nash implementation had been completely solved, we argue that there exists a new result as Proposition 2 specifies.
Since the two-agent quantum mechanism only requires two qubits to work, theoretically current experimental technologies of quantum information are adequate [7] . Moreover, the problem of time and space complexity existed in the algorithmic mechanism [6] does not exist here because the number of agents are exactly two. Therefore, the two-agent algorithmic mechanism can be applied to practical cases immediately. In this sense, the new result on twoagent Nash implementation holds not only in the quantum world, but also in the macro world.
Consider the SCR f specified by Table 1 .
Obviously,
For each 4-tuple (a, θ, a For rule (i):
Hence, rule (i) is satisfied.
For rule (ii):
Hence, rule (ii) is satisfied.
To sum up, the SCR f given in Table 1 satisfies condition µ2. Therefore, according to Moore-Repullo's theorem, it should be Nash implementable. However, as shown in Section 3 and 4, when condition λ ′ is satisfied, neither in the quantum world nor in the macro world will the SCR f be Nash implementable.
